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FOREWORD 
NASA experience has indicated a need for uniform design criteria for space vehicles: 
Accordingly, criteria are being developed in the following areas of technology: I 
, 
Environment 
I Structures 
, 
Guidance and Control 1 
Chemical Propulsion 
i Individual components are issued as separate monographs as soon as they are completed. A 
list of monographs published in this series can be found on the last page. 
These monographs are to be regarded as gGides to design and net  as NASA requirements 
except as may be specified in formal project specifications. It is expected, however. that the 
monographs will be used to develop requirements for specific projects and be cited as the 
applicable documents in mission studies, or in contracts for the design and development of 
space vehicle systems. 
This monograph was prepared under the cognizance of the NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) by Robert Lyle, Pericles Stabekis, and Robert Stroud of Exotech Systems, 
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Grobowski & Associates did preliminary work on some sections. 
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ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL OF 
SPACECRAFT ELECTROMAGNET IC 
1. 
INTERFERENCE 
I N T  RO DU C T I  ON 
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) is any electromagnetic signal or disturbance, natural or 
man-made, that can degrade or inhibit the operation of electrical devices aboard space 
vehic!es. Some of the more important operations that are subject to disturbance are 
guidance, sequence stage firing, command communications, tracking, experiment data 
collection, and telemetering. The frequency span of greatest concern ranges from 30 Hz to 
10 GHz but may extend to higher frequencies in special cases. 
Electromagnetic interference may arise from an onboard source or from an external source 
such as radio .frequency (RF) transmission from Earth (ref. 1). This design criteria 
m-onngraph provides guidance for assessing the EM1 possibilities from onboard sources and 
establishing requisite control in spacecraft design, development, and testing. A related 
monograph (NASA SP-8037) gives guidance for assessment and control of spacecraft 
magnetic fields. 
2. S T A T E  OF T H E  
Electromagnetic interference problems, widely encountered in aerospace programs from the 
beginning, have become increasingly serious because of (1) the increased number of 
electronic devices that are required to operate within constrained spatial and spectral 
environments, (2) the high power levels of energy sources, and (3) the increased sensitivity 
of equipment. Numerous approaches for controlling EM1 have been developed including 
design and test specifications for onboard electronic equipment, testing techniques, design 
concepts, and project management procedures. 
2.7 FLIGHT EXPERIENCE 
It is a matter of record that a large number of flight delays and failures have resulted from 
EMI. The launch of the Beacon Explorer 3 spacecraft was delayed when interference was 
belatedly discovered after the spacecraft had been attached to the launch vehicle, and it is 
believed that both channels on the Ranger 6 TV camera were burned out through an 
unscheduled triggering of the equipment 67 seconds after launch (ref. 2). 
On several spacecraft it has been necessary to resort to sequential operation of the 
experiments because of interference between them. Until 1968 that was the case for all of 
the OGO spacecraft in which each experiment was given its own on/off power command. 
1 
Weight restraints prevented installation of such switching devices on Ariel 3 .  Consequently, 
measurements taken on the concentration of molecular oxygen became confused with data 
collected on the absolute values of cosmic noise; the value of both experiments was greatly 
reduced (ref. 3). 
Lack of adequate grounding on Mariner 2 and the resultant shorting of one of the solar 
panels contributed to a very large change in the magnetic field of that spacecraft. The 
change was on the order of 100 gamma, several hundred times the sensitivity limit of the 
magnetometer sensor. Fortunately, the sensor was built with two ranges and measurements 
were obtained with the upper range. The sensitivity of the instrument was reduced greatly, 
however. The large field change, never completely explained, may have resulted from 
location of the magnetometer, sensor and an omnidirectional antenna on the same support. 
The support was carrying currents, and the lack of adequate grounding forced the spacecraft 
structure to carry part of the return. When one of the panels shorted, the change in paths of 
the currents flowing near the magnetometer sensor may have caused the large field change 
(ref. 3). 
’ 
Special precautionary steps must be taken when new electronic equipment is introduced 
into an existing spacecraft. For example, a VHF/UHF dual-channel receiver was added to 
the Mariner Venus 67 spacecraft to determine the electron density in space. The 
determination was to be made by the transmission of two modulated, coherent carriers from 
the ground at 49.8 and 423.3 MHz. From the relative phase of the received carriers and their 
sidebands the electron density could be inferred. When a compatibility check was made 
between the dual frequency feceiver and an S-Band transponder, it was found that the 
S-Band transmitter frequency was entering the UHF channel of the dual receiver and causing 
generation of S-Band frequencies that would exit from the 423.3 MHz receiver and enter the 
S-Band receiver. These frequencies, in turn, would cause the phase lock loop to jam and be 
driven out of lock with the required signal (ref. 4). On the basis of the compatibility check, 
it was recommended that RF filters be installed at the input of each dual frequency receiver 
channel. This was particularly desirable because the dual frequency receiver did not have 
any preselector filters. It was further recommended that an antenna range perform coupling 
tests between each of the antennas on the spacecraft. From these tests, it was determined 
thaf the coupling between the S-Band transmitter antenna and the UHF antennas was only 
marginal and that installation of the filters would provide adequate isolation. The final 
filters selected were a lowpass filter for the UHF channel and a bandpass filter for the VHF 
channel. 
The possible consequence of uncontrolled stray-wiring capacity was illustrated by residual 
voltage on the Mariner Mars 69 Pyro Control Unit (ref. 5). The Pyro Control Unit was 
powered by an ac power supply and activated with a single pole switch remote from both 
units, as illustrated in figure 1. Inside the Pyro Control Unit, power is rectified for charging 
capacitor banks that store the energy required to fire squibs. A residual 0.5 volt was 
detected on the capacitors even with the switch open. Although the investigation proved 
that the residual voltage was not a technical or safety problem (the normal firing voltage is 
40 volts), there was initial concern because the origin and cause were unknown. The 
confirmed equivalent circuit and a graph of the capacitor voltage vs coupling capacitance are 
shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively. It can be seen that the problem would have been 
considerably worse if the distance to the switch had been greater. 
2 
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Figure 1 .  - Block diagram of pyro-power configuration. 
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Figure 2. - Equivalent circuit of pyro-power configuration. 
3 
The foregoing example illustrates that stray parameters, such as the wiring coupling capacity 
that may appear insignificant at first, can have a large influence on parameters that are 
significant - in this case, the capacitor bank voltage. The solution was to  route both wires 
into the Pyro Unit together and switch them both (ref. 5 ) .  
2.2 SOURCES OF EM1 
'Electromagnetic interference in spacecraft has been traced to two sources: RF transmission 
from Earth, aircraft, or other spacecraft; and electromagnetic energy from companion 
components or systems on the spacecraft. Most EM1 problems for the spacecraft in its flight 
arise from onboard sources rather than from distant transmission; the internal sources are 
the main concern of this monograph, so will be treated in some detail. 
The onboard components or systems generating the interference may be functional or 
incidental. Functional sources are those designed for the specific purpose of generating 
electromagnetic energy, such as oscillators, multipliers, mixers, beacons, and transmitters. 
Incidental sources are those not designed to generate electromagnetic energy, such as power 
converters, motors, switches, relays, solenoids, and parasitic oscillators. Unlike functional 
sources, onboard incidental sources can often be circumvented or suppressed without 
impairing system or subsystem functions. 
EM1 may be narrowband or broadband in nature. Narrowband interference consists of 
interference signals that are present at only one frequency or over a narrow range of 
frequencies. It generally results from a functional source. In the case of communication or 
radar transmitters, the functional signal is normally accompanied by spurious output that 
may be harmonically related to the fundamental output. Broadband interference involves 
undesired signals that are present over a wide range of frequencies such as noise or impulses 
and are generally produced by incidental sources. 
Whereas the average value of narrowband frequency signals is close to their amplitude, 
impulse type of broadband signals typically have much higher peak values than average 
values. Table I, supplied by A. Whittlesey of JPL, presents the effect of receiver bandwidth 
on signal to noise (S/N) ratio as a function of various signals. 
2.2.1 'Functional Sources 
The simplest form of a functional signal is the single-frequency sine wave. However, even 
though equipment containing oscillators, multipliers, and amplifiers are designed to produce 
single-frequency sine waves, such equipment has instabilities and nonlinear circuits and 
elements.* As a result energy is present in a narrowband around the fundamental and at 
harmonic and spurious frequencies during operation. Stabilizing the operation of the 
equipment and reducing the effects of the nonlinearity can control the energy bandwidth 
and the harmonic or spurious output from these sine wave sources. 
*Nonlinear circuits are those in which voltage and current are not directly proportional over the operating range. With 
nonlinear circuits, the theory of superposition does not apply. Consequently, frequencies are produced in the circuit other 
than those that have been externally impressed. 
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In the case of more complex sources such as communication, telemetry, or radar 
transmitters, the generation of the functional signal is normally accompanied by the 
generation of undesired electromagnetic energy. For example, transmitters (particularly 
their traveling wave tubes) generate spurious outputs at frequencies other than the operating 
I frequency. These spurious outputs are not needed for the operation of the equipment and, 
therefore, should be eliminated or their amplitude reduced as much as possible. The level of 
the broadband noise radiated by transmitters is generally low, but in some cases, it is high 
. enough to cause desensitization or interference tonearby receivers. This noise is not easily 
recognizable because it does not produce a characteristic output from the receiver and it is 
almost identical in form to the characteristic receiver noise. 
Another form of interference associated with functional sources is radiation of RF energy 
from the case of a transmitter or other high-frequency generator. This radiation can 
seriously affect the performance of colocated equipment. It is usually eliminated by 
grounding, bonding, shielding, and proper wire separation and treatment techniques. 
2.2.2 Incidental Sources 
The interfering energy from incidental sources occurs over a wide range of frequencies and is 
broadband. Broadband interference can be further classified as either random or impulsive. 
2 2.2.1 Random Interference 
Thermal agitation can produce interference having random amplitudes. Atmospheric 
interference, cosmic and solar noise, and corona also are considered random because the 
impulses are frequent and overlap with a number of sharp peaks exceeding the average level. 
Other types of interference that consist of impulses which follow each other rapidly and are 
not individually distinguishable also may be considered random. 
2.2.2.2 Impulsive Interference 
Impulse interference is made up of one or more sharp pulses that may be periodic or 
aperiodic. The characteristics of this type of interference are determined by the shape and 
repetition frequency of the pulses. Attitude control thrustors. torquers, turn-on transients, 
clock and digital pulses, and other pulse-type electrical disturbances are typical sources of 
impulse interference. 
2.3 T R A N S  M I S S 1 0  N O F  E L E C T R O M A G N  ET1 C I N T E R F E R E N C E  
Interference can be transmitted from a source to a susceptible component or system by 
conduction or radiation. Conducted interference involves introduction of electromagnetic 
energy through external connections. Radiated interference is electromagnetic energy that is 
introduced into equipment from external sources without external connections. A 
quantitative description of transmission by conduction requires circuit theory (ref. 2), and 
description of transmission by radiation requires field theory (ref. 6 ) .  
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2.3.1 Conducted I nterf e rence 
There are several modes by which circuit components can generate interference in other 
circuits or components. The most common is conduction via direct electrical connections 
such as cables. Frequently, it is necessary to  transmit power and operational signals via 
cables, and it is possible to conduct interference with the desired signal, particularly in the. 
case of long cables. 
Magnetic flux linkage is probably the predominant mode of interference transfer other than 
direct conduction in high current circuits, whereas capacitive coupling is dominant in high 
voltage circuits. A magnetic field generated by steady alternating current or transiently 
changing current will produce an interfering voltage proportional to the rate of change of 
flux. Therefore, high frequency, high power currents, such as in radar equipment, and 
currents in multiturn coils are sources of interference. Likewise, devices that produce a high 
rate of change of current, such as switches, can generate strong pulses capable of producing 
interference. 
The source of interference on a circuit could be a signal on another wire that is coupled to 
the circuit by capacitance, inductance, or a common impedance and results in crosstalk (ref. 
5 ) .  Capacitive coupling depends on a rapid voltage change (dv/dt) that is coupled to an 
adjacent circuit through a coupling capacity (cc) as shown in figure 4. The magnitude of the 
coupled voltage V, depends on the dv/dt of circuit No. 1 and the relative values of cc, the 
load resistance, and the shunt capacity to ground. This situation often occurs because of 
adjacent wiring or circuitry. Interference in inductive coupling is also caused by a rapid 
waveform change. In this case, however, it is the change in current (di/dt) that causes the 
effect (fig. 5) .  .The di/dt in the first circuit creates a proportionate voltage in circuit No. 2, 
as does a transformer; an increase of the common circuit area can also cause an increase in 
the coupled voltage (ref. 5 ) .  Inductive coupling is less of a problem in spacecraft circuits 
than capacitive coupling because of the small currents generally present. 
Common impedance coupling occurs when several circuits share a common return with 
significant impedance. In such case, current in one circuit can create significant voltage 
differentials that will react unfavorably on another circuit. Also, the combined effect of 
several circuits operating together may cause interference with another circuit. For more 
detail on this effect, see NASA SP-3067 (Taylor, R. E., ed., “Radio Frequency Interference 
Handbook,” 197 1. 
I 
Noise voltages or currents may appear because of component defects. For example, high 
resistance may inadvertently occur at contacts, such as the operative contact of relays, 
pressure and soldered connections, and connectors. Also, insulation failures may occur 
causing accidental shorts and grounds. These defects do not necessarily cause direct failures 
or faulty operation of the related equipment, but they may degrade or destroy its operation 
by reason of noise or polarization inserted into the system by the defective component. 
2.3.2 Radiated Interference 
Radiated interference, e.g., from a dipole, can cause bias to appear across diodes, transistors, 
tube grids, and other nonlinear circuits. Nonlinear circuits susceptible to radiated 
interference can generate sum and difference frequencies between the interference and the 
signal frequencies in the circuit and can also generate harmonic frequencies of the 
interfering signal. 
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Figure 4. - Capacitive coupling. 
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Figure 5 .  - Inductive coupling. 
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2.4 SUSCEPTIBLE EQUIPMENT 
Scientific spacecraft have introduced a new dimension to achievement of electromagnetic 
compatibility because many of the scientific instruments are attempting to measure signals 
in the natural space environment that are masked by the spacecraft noise.Therefore, existing 
EM1 specifications are not adequate to  cope with ultra-sensitive, extremely-broadband 
signals. Special efforts are required to ensure that each experiment can accomplish its 
scientific mission. 
Common mode interference is frequently encountered in instrumentation amplifiers because 
of high gains and sensitivity. This problem requires increased attention to bandwidth 
requirements and grounding configurations. Printed circuit board sometimes have excessive 
go.uild-.- y a u ~  - L1- loiiting - aiid iiisafficient cmductcr cress-secticn (ref. 7). 
Because of low-humidity test environments, and other clean room requirements, static 
discharges on sensitive microcircuits have caused component breakdowns when adequate 
preventive measures have not been taken. 
In many cases, circuits are designed with unnecessary sensitivity. For example, a switching 
circuit whose norm21 ccmmand is a p l s e  of 0 volts for 75 to 125 milliseconds duration was 
found to  be triggered by 2 volt spikes with a duration of 4 to 5 microseconds. There is a 
tendency to overdesign for reliability of operation at the expense of increased susceptibility 
to interference. 
2.5 BASIC FACTORS IN ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT 
Each spacecraft has its peculiar electromagnetic environment which is determined by five 
interrelated factors : 
Spacecraft configuration 
Spacecraft stabilization 
Electronic and electrical systems 
Orbit and trajectory 
Scientific mission requirements 
Spacecraft Configuration, by affecting distances between components, systems, and the 
length and routing of wiring harnesses, influences the overall electromagnetic environment. 
The intensity of interference from magnetic flux linkage, capacitive coupling, and radiation 
increases with decreasing distance between the source and susceptible system. Therefore, if 
there is less physical separation between the sources and systems more stringent 
requirements on equipment are necessary. Further complications arise with weight 
restrictions that limit the extent and type of shielding and filtering devices that may be 
used. 
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The stabilization method chosen for the spacecraft is a factor in determining spacecraft 
configuration and thus, indirectly, EM1 possibilities. Spacecraft stabilization predetermines 
the basic type and placement of receiving and transmitting antennas, which in turn influence 
the electromagnetic environment. The omnidirectional, low-gain antennas appropriate to 
spinstabilized spacecraft, for example, require higher transmitter power or greater receiver 
sensitivity than directional antennas in order to perform as effectively (ref 8). 
Each additional electrical or electronic system added to the spacecraft multiplies the 
problem of electromagnetic interference analysis and control because all systems (including 
power supplies) must be evaluated with respect to all other systems. This complicates 
consideration of frequency allocations, bandwidths, orientation of systems, sensitivity of 
antenna-terminated systems, sensor characteristics, and grounding systems. 
The fourth factor, orbit and trajectory is concerned with signals that originate externally 
such as those from Earth and radiation belts. Over different geographical regions the 
spacecraft may be exposed to many signals that are unrelated to the mission, but which are 
close to frequencies used for the mission.” Consequently, such signals may be accepted by 
the spacecraft receiver because of its input bandwidth and sensitivity characteristics. This 
may occur even though Earth transmitters supporting the mission are providing the desired 
energy levels to the spacecraft at properly-allocated frequencies. 
Scientific instruments impose special requirements such as very low frequencies, no discrete 
signals within the bandwidth of the instrument, and higher sensitivities. 
2.6 DESIGN PROCEDURES 
Three current state-of-the-art design approaches for control of EM1 are summarized below. 
The first design approach involves a thorough study of all EM1 possibilities. Such study leads 
to development of EM1 control and test requirements that are tailored to the particular 
spacecraft. However, it should be noted that despite such studies there has been a tendency 
to adhere to standardized EM1 test specifications. Because standardized tests may be stricter 
in some areas than required for a particular spacecraft, this approach can lead to  overdesign 
and consequent cost and weight penalties. 
Another design approach relies almost entirely on compliance with EM1 test specifications 
developed by NASA or the military (refs. 9 and 10). The military specifications, which are 
stringent, generally assure compliance with space system integration and mission 
requirements but have the disadvantage of being expensive and not designed to the specific 
needs of the individual spacecraft. Component substitution to effect miniaturization and 
weight-saving in filters and the shielding of compartments may compromise electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMC). 
* M a w  H.J. and Blakely, S.W.; “Analysis of Unexpected Spacecraft Status Changes”, NASA Goddard Space Fllght Center, 
Aug. 1970 (working paper). 
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The third design approach is usually applied to spacecraft with new and sophisticated 
equipment. In such cases, the design of subsystems and experiments takes into account the 
particular RF and EM1 situation with little reference to existing EM1 specifications. 
In recent years, attempts have been made to adapt computer analysis t o  electromagnetic 
compatibility problems. A survey of three computer-aided intrasystem EMC prediction 
programs is given in reference 11.  One of these programs has been applied to  the Pioneer 
program. This is apparently the first project for which this approach to EMC has been 
utilized over the full course of a design development and test cycle (ref. 12). 
2.7 ELECTI!O.MAGN ETlC INTERFERENCE CON1 ROL TECHNIQUES 
Electromagnetic interference analysis is used on the system level to  evaluate the system 
compatibility and to reveal specific areas where interference problems are likely to arise. 
Once the analysis has revealed problem areas, there are several techniques available to  
control or reduce interference. These techniques, however, contain inherent disadvantages 
such as added cost and increased weight so compromise is usually necessary. The following 
techniques are among those available to establish compatibility. 
Grounding consists of establishing an electrical conductive path between circuits to some 
reference point. The basic purpose is to maintain all parts of the system at the same 
potential so that unwanted excess electromagnetic energy will equalize throughout the 
system. To provide good grounding, the connections should not present any more 
opposition to the electric current than it encounters when it passes through the conductor 
up to  the point of connection. 
Electrical bonding is the process of mechanically connecting certain metal parts so that they 
will make a good low-resistance contact. Welding, soldering, and pressure connection are 
used according to  the required quality of the bond. 
Another effective way to reduce interference is through the use of shielding. Shielding is 
used to contain interference generated from a source or protect susceptible equipment by 
attenuating the interfering signal. However, certain discontinuities are necessary in the shield 
to  permit input and output connections. The shield design must accommodate these 
discontinuities without substantially diminishing the overall shielding effectiveness. 
Interference reduction filters provide another means for establishing compatibility. Filters 
are often used in conjunction with shielding to attenuate interference that may enter or 
leave through breaks in the shield for wiring. 
Care in routing wires and cables can also assist in control of interference. Routing includes 
physical separation, cable placement. and sorting into bundles. In bundling, wires and cables 
are segregated into compatible groups which are shielded. Interference from inductive and 
capacitive coupling resulting from proximity of wire pairs within a bundle, can be 
significantly reduced by twisting of the transmitting or receiving pair. This has the effect of 
reducing the common circuit area between the two twisted circuits. 
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2.8 TESTING 
The field of interference measurements, including both susceptibility and emanation, 
employs many of the same methods and equipment used for other radio frequency 
measurements. Peculiar to interference measurements, however, is the wide range of 
frequencies and signal levels that must be considered. Consequently, some of the equipment 
and techniques used to provide signal sources, receivers, and antennas as well as to perform 
the measurements, have been specially devised for interference work. 
2.8.1 Setups 
There is a wide variety of test setups corresponding to the wide variety of equipment that 
may require interference tests. In many instances, tests are performed in some form of 
shielded enclosure with the test specimen placed on a bench, if it is small enough, or in a 
rack or cabinet, if larger. When equipment is tested aboard spacecraft or in simulated 
conditions, the environment external to the immediate area of the test may cause 
interference. 
Setup difficulties often arise when auxiliary units, which are not to be tested, are required 
to operate the unit under test, monitor its performance, or note susceptibility to 
interference. These auxiliary units include power supplies, signal generators, monitoring 
equipment and loads. It is necessary to ensure that the auxiliary units do not add to the EM1 
environment, and that they substantially duplicate the “in-flight” operation and 
configuration of the equipment under test. 
2.8.2 Types of Tests 
Most commonly performed tests are system compatibility tests to determine the ability of 
individual spacecraft subsystems to operate simultaneously without causing degradation of 
performance. In addition to the system compatibility testing, the following two subsystem 
tests have been included in certain programs: (1) subsystem interference tests to measure 
the magnitude of undesired interfering signals emanating from individual spacecraft or 
support equipments; and (2) subsystem susceptibility tests to determine whether individual 
spacecraft or support equipments will satisfactorily operate when subjected to undesired 
external signals. 
In general, interference and susceptibility testing includes “radiated” and “conducted” 
measurements. 
2.8.31 Measurement of Radiated Interference 
Radiated interference measurements performed in testing are primarily near-field 
measurements (ref. 3). In the near field, the magnetic (H) and electric (E) components of 
the field are measured separately because they do not have the simple time, space, and 
amplitude relationship that they have in the far field. The H field is measured by a loop 
antenna, and the E field by a rod or dipole. 
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In the actual performance of radiated interference tests, the appropriate antenna is set up at 
a distance of one to three feet from the unit under test. and connected to a frequency 
selective voltmeter (FSVM). The frequency range of interest is scanned with readings taken 
where signals are noted. The FSVM is calibrated at each frequency as the gain varies with 
frequency because of 
antenna factor (ref. 9). 
Radiated susceptibility 
source is connected to 
voltage supplied to the 
13. 
2.8.4 M e a s u r e m e n t  
characteristics of transmission lines: room dimenkons, and the 
tests are performed in a similar manner. In this case the signal 
the antenna, and a means is provided for monitoring the power or 
test antenna. Further descriptions are included in references 9 and 
of Conducted  Interference 
For conducted interference measurements in testing of power lines and signal lines, two 
different pickup devices are used; line impedance stabilization networks (LISN) and current 
probes. The LISN method has been used for a long time to measure interference, but now 
several specifications stipulate LISN in conjunction with the clamp-on current probe. 
The LISN, whose schematic diagram is shown in figure 6, is a device which provides an 
artificial, but known, impedance in the power line and a convenient method of connecting 
the interference measurement equipment. Above 25 MHz the impedance of the network 
varies so unpredictably that it is unusable (ref. 9). 
The current probe furnishes a current measurement. In general it requires no alteration of 
the cables to  be tested unless individual leads must be separated for separate measurements. 
Although it normally will not affect the circuit to be measured: caution is required when the 
current probe is used on sensitive signal lines of low impedance because the series impedance 
of the probe may appreciably change the overall circuit impedance. 
Ground Terminal 
Terminal 
Figure 6. - Line impedance stabil ization network. 
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An advantage of the current probe, besides its requiring no insertion into the circuit, is its 
wide frequency range (from 30 Hz to 1 GHz in several designs), which permits 
measurements well beyond the 25 MHz limit of the LISN. 
The susceptibility tests for conducted interference may be divided into two areas, RF and 
audio. The RF test is the simpler of the two and uses the foregoing LISN as the coupling 
device from the signal source to  the power line. Susceptibility limits are usually specified as 
a voltage or power level. From 5 to 25 MHz, the LISN is assumed to be a 50 ohm load. 
Below 5 MHz, the impedance decreases to as low as approximately 5 ohms at  150 KHz (ref. 
2). Because all LISN’s have this characteristic, meaningful and repeatable tests are possible 
in spite of the mismatch. 
The audio test is a more complex but also a better-designed test. The test signal is coupled 
to the power line through a speciallydesigned current transformer. Enough signal current 
must be coupled into the line to cause a drop of several volts across the input of the test 
sample to the exact level given by the particular specification. To accomplish this, an audio 
amplifier of about 50 watts output is used to drive the current transformer. The signal 
voltage is monitored by an oscilloscope. 
Reference 9 suggests a useful device to aid in monitoring the signal voltage on an ac line. It 
is a variable phase shifter so arranged in the test circuit as to null out the line frequency 
insofar as the monitoring device is concerned. This permits a direct measurement of the 
audio signal voltage on the face of the oscilloscope. 
One principle followed by most electromagnetic interference specifications concerns the 
method of operating the unit under test, i.e., the unit shall be operated so as to produce the 
highest levels of interference or maximum susceptibility. This approach is valuable in 
situations in which the number of variables in the operation of a unit would require an 
unreasonably high number of interference or susceptibility tests. The identifiable effects of 
each variable are considered in the test planning stage and are selected to produce the 
maximum interference or susceptibility. Then, only those variables whose effects are 
uncertain must be examined experimentally during the interference and susceptibility tests. 
Because of the extensive use of digital signals on spacecraft circuits, the measurement of 
transient interference has increased in test programs. In addition, transients are being 
injected into interface circuits to determine their susceptibility. 
3. CRITERIA 
Consideration of the electromagnetic interference arising from both functional and 
incidental sources is essential to satisfactory design of the spacecraft. A control program for 
electromagnetic interference should be instituted in the early design phases of a spacecraft 
program to suppress unwanted interference and ensure proper design of equipment or 
systems so that they will operate compatibly with the other electronic and electrical devices 
in the operating environment. 
3.1 MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES FOR EM1 CONTROL 
The key element of an effective EM1 control program is recognition by management and 
design engineers of the importance of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) to mission success. 
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The cornerstone of the EM1 program is an EM1 Control Plan. This plan should provide 
explicit directions as to  what should be done. 
The table of contents of the control plan might contain the following sections: 
1.0 Scope 
2.0 Applicable Documents 
3 .O Requirements 
3.1 Preliminary Analysis of Design 
3.2 Design Requirements 
3.3 Documentation Requirements 
3.4 Test Requirements 
4.0 Management Plan 
4.1 Organization 
4.2 Responsibilities 
4.3 Schedules 
4.4 EM1 Control Program Reviews 
4.5 Quality Assurance Provisions 
5 .O Appendices 
5.1 Definitions 
5.2 Design Guidelines 
3.2 A S S E S S M E N T  OF E M 1  
A review should be made of all the proposed sensitive equipment to be carried on the 
spacecraft and all the potential sources of electromagnetic interference expected to  be 
included in the spacecraft design to identify EM1 possibilities and associated conflicting 
requirements. The required level of interference control is determined by mission objectives 
and spacecraft operational requirements. Acceptable signal levels for functionally-and 
incidentally generated electromagnetic energy should be established accordingly. 
3.2.1 Sources of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 
EM1 generated by the spacecraft, Earth transmissions, and by natural sources should be 
considered. The functional and incidental sources of EM1 on the spacecraft should be 
identified and their characteristics and transmission modes evaluated. 
Functional sources arise from equipment designed to radiate electromagnetic energy. Major 
functional sources that should be considered are: 
Oscillators Signal generators 
Radar transmitters Beacons 
Communication transmitters Transponders 
Telemetry transmitters 
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Incidental sources arise from equipment not designed to radiate electromagnetic energy. 
Major incidental sources that should be considered are : 
Power systems and distribution Switches 
Solenoids 
Motors 
Relays 
Gyros 
The primary natural sources to be considered are : 
Galactic noise 
Terrestrial noise 
Cosmic noise 
3.2.2 Susceptible Equipment 
Any device capable of responding to electrical signals, or to fields associated with these 
signals, is vulnerable to interference. These devices should be identified and their sensitivities 
determined. Such equipment includes but is not limited to  the following types: 
Experiments Field effect devices 
Receivers Sensors (optical and thermal) 
Pyrotechnic devices Preamplifiers 
Electrical switches Infrared detectors 
Recording devices 
3.3 DESIGN PROCEDURES 
After identification and evaluation of EM1 sources and susceptible equipment and potential 
coupling modes, a control program should be established. Its objective should be operational 
compatibility commensurate with mission requirements of spacecraft subsystems. 
Compatibility can be achieved by interference suppression, a proper grounding scheme, and 
attention to good EMC design practices. Interference should be suppressed at its source 
whenever possible since a single source may effect many susceptible components or systems. 
The difficulty involved in interference suppression at the source, however, generally depends 
on whether the source is functional or incidental. When the interfering signal is an 
intentionally generated carrier of useful information from a functional source, reduction of 
interference at the transmitter must rely on techniques for modifying signal strength, 
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frequency, and operational schedule. In some cases, interference must be suppressed at the 
susceptible equipment. Still other alternatives to suppression at the sources of 
intentionally-generated signals are : 
Re-allocation of the intentionally-generated signal frequency. 
Relocation and reorientation of either the susceptible device or the transmitting device 
to  minimize impingement of interference signals. 
Design of a time-sharing operations plan based on the priorities of mission 
requirements for operation of the transmitting system and the interference-susceptible 
device. 
Additional shielding and filtering. 
3.4 TESTING 
A series of interference and susceptibility tests should be used to ascertain that EM1 
characteristics of the spacecraft equipment comply with requirements of the control plan. 
Overall system integration tests should be applied to establish overall compatibility of the 
spacecraft’s equipment. Interference and susceptibility tests that may be required for EM1 
control programs include : 
Radiated interference measurements 
Antennaconducted spurious emanation measurements 
Powerline conducted interference measurements 
Signal-line and powerline conducted transient interference measurements 
Signal-line magnetic field susceptibility measurements 
Electromagnetic compatibility qualification tests 
Radiated susceptibility measurements 
Receiver input rejection and cross-modulation measurements 
Low-power transmitter cross-modulation susceptibility measurements 
Receiver intermodulation measurements 
Tests for spurious transmitter emissions. 
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4. R E C O M M E N D E D  PRACTICES 
4.1 I N T E R F E R E N C E  C O N T R O L  P R O G R A M  
It is important that serious interference possibilities be foreseen as early as possible in the 
spacecraft program to allow time for effective and economical action. Therefore, an 
interference control program should be established in the preliminary design phase of 
spacecraft development to identify EM1 problems systematically and implement control 
measures. 
The control program should be based on the particular mission and spacecraft rather than 
on generalized requirements of electromagnetic interference specifications. 
The primary objective of the control measures is to prevent any subsystem from having an 
adverse effect on the operation of any other subsystem. Thus, the compatibility of the 
spacecraft system should be continually analyzed and evaluated throughout system design 
and development, and specific interference control techniques should be designated for the 
compatibility problems likely to be encountered. Engineering and management milestones 
should be established that do not affect the overall mission schedule adversely. 
The control program should describe as quantitatively as possible acceptability standards for 
interference sources and susceptible systems, outline appropriate interference tests and 
evaluation procedures, and present methods for treatment of identified problems. 
4.2 A S S E S S M E N T  OF S P A C E C R A F T  R E Q U I R E M E N T S  F O R  
ELECT R O  MAGN ET I C  CO M P  AT1 B l L l T Y  ( E M  C) 
The spacecraft requirements for EMC are determined by mission objectives and the 
associated requkements for equipment susceptible to EM1 and potential EM1 sources. These 
considerations are prerequisites to the design and implementation of a control program 
which will operate throughout design, development, and all flight preparations to ensure 
that EM1 does not degrade performance in the mission. In addition to onboard systems, the 
assessment of EMC requirements should include a critical evaluation of launch vehicle 
systems and ground support equipment because of possible effects on spacecraft design. 
Launch vehicle considerations are primarily important in telemetering and command 
functions in which separately-powered equipment is mounted on both the vehicle and the 
spacecraft. Couplings between antennas, frequency allocation management, operational 
timing plans for vehicle and spacecraft are of concern. 
Ground support equipment operating away from the immediate test and launch areas is not 
necessarily subject to the overall electromagnetic interference control program. It should be 
given careful consideration because of the potential interference hazards, however. Ground 
support equipment that is closely associated with the spacecraft during test and launch 
should be checked carefully for proper grounding, bonding, and cable shielding. It should be 
noted that ground support equipment, unlike the spacecraft, are not weight-limited and so 
can be shielded heavily. 
18 
From the standpoint of interference control and reduction techniques, the system design is 
divided basically into four stages: (1) the initial stage when the basic design concepts are 
formulated and the system parameters are specified, (2) the selection of the equipments or 
subsystems that will be used in the system, (3) the combination of the selected equipments 
or subsystems into a system, and (4) the performance of compatibility tests and final 
adjustments on the complete system to minimize the risk of performance degradation as a 
result of electromagnetic interference. In each of these stages there are usually trade-off 
relationships that should be evaluated by the designer. EM1 considerations should be 
evaluated in the perspective of mission objectives, project schedule, and budget to determine 
the measures that will optimize electromagnetic compatibility of spacecraft systems without 
compromising other requirements. 
4.2.1 Initial System Design 
During the initial stage of system design, electromagnetic compatibility should be 
considered as a requirement of candidate subsystems and their elements so that proper 
attention is given to EM1 in evaluating the various trade-off relationships considered by the 
desimer. Frequency assignment, trmsmitter Fower lev&, receiver sensitivity levels, 
switching levels of digital circuits, and operational schedules are a few examples of 
subsystem characteristics and parameters that have a significant effect on electromagnetic 
compatibility. The wide variety of operational requirements and compatibility problems 
make it impossible to present specific recommendations for designing an optimum system 
for any generalized set of mission requirements. Each subsystem should be examined 
individually as t o  functional requirements and associated boundary conditions 
(electromagnetic interfaces with other parts of the spacecraft and the mission environment) 
and the system parameters should be selected accordingly. 
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4.2.2 Selection of Equipment 
The next stage of the system design involves the selection of equipment that will be used in 
the system to perform the required functions, e.g., electrical power source, transmitters, and 
receivers. At this point, electromagnetic compatibility should be considered in specifying 
equipment-operating characteristics, in testing equipment to ensure that they conform to 
specifications, and in modifying the design or operating schedule to accomodate residual 
compatibility problems. 
4.2.3 System Integration 
When the selected equipment and subsystems are combined into a spacecraft system, 
interface and grounding problems may require attention. Interface problems can be 
corrected or improved by re-routing cables, relocating or reorienting equipment, filtering of 
input and output leads, and shielding potential EM1 sources and susceptible equipment. For 
grounding the system, it is desirable to provide a single dc ground for all subsystems to 
minimize the risk of common currents. (For larger spacecraft, a number of grounds may be 
necessary, however, to handle all the subsystems). Bonding also should be considered on a 
sys tem basis. 
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4.2.4 System Compat ib i l i ty  
Finally, the system components and equipments should be subjected to applicable 
interference tests to uncover residual problems. Care should be taken that test equipment 
and breakout boxes including associated long leads do not alter the grounding configuration 
or induce or generate interference. The system designer should assist in the preparation of 
the overall system compatibility tests to ensure that the complete system will perform 
according to the requirements established for the mission. 
4.3 I N T E R F E R E N C E  C O N T R O L  A N A L Y S I S  
The  first phase of the interference analysis is to identify potential sources of 
electromagnetic interference and define their interference characteristics. For the purpose of 
this analysis the amplitude versus frequency and the amplitude versus time characteristics 
are specified for each source. This information is generally obtained from equipment 
manuals and schematics, from the designers of the equipment, and from the results of 
measurements performed. 
After identification of the sources, all susceptible equipment and their sensitivity 
characteristics should be identified and defined. Basically, the types of signals to which the 
susceptible equipment will respond are established, and the susceptibility versus frequency 
(or any other important parameters for each type of signal that can produce interference) is 
defined. Sensitivity, selectivity, and response characteristics are obtained from schematics, 
equipment designers, or from results of interference measurements performed on the 
equipment . 
After definition of possible EM1 sources and susceptible equipment, the next phase of 
analysis is to determine situations in which EM1 problems are likely to occur. In general, 
potential problems are evaluated by using the transmission loss to modify the source 
function so that the resulting function represents the interference level at the susceptible 
equipment. This resulting function is then compared to the equipment susceptibility 
function (as shown in figure 7) to  determine whether the amplitude of the potentially 
interfering signal is sufficient to cause an undesirable response in the susceptible equipment. 
In figure 7, it is seen that a compatibility problem is likely to result from a source function 
at frequency f, (ref. 2). In general, if an undesired response is produced by a signal, then its 
effect on the operation of the susceptible equipment is assessed for interference. 
Besides evaluating the interference effect of specific sources, the total electromagnetic 
environment resulting from the operation of all the onboard electric and electronic 
subsystems is also evaluated. Each equipment susceptibility characteristic is then compared 
to  the environment levels to determine whether the equipments are compatible with the 
electromagnetic environment in which they are required to operate. 
The final phase of the system interference analysis is to define the amount of interference 
reduction necessary to eliminate the compatibility problems and to  determine the 
techniques to be applied to  subsystem designs to ensure compatibility. 
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Figure 7. - Elements of electromagnetic compatibility analysis. 
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4.4 INTERFERENCE CONTROL TECHNIQUES 
The basic hardware techniques for minimizing electromagnetic interference are shielding, 
grounding, wire treatment and routing, and filtering. 
4.4.1 Shielding 
Shielding is used to  enclose equipment so that spurious signals generated by the equipment 
or those interfering with the equipment are completely excluded. The type of material used 
for shielding is usually determined by the lowest frequencies at which a given shielding 
effectiveness is required. High conductivity metals, such as copper and aluminum, offer 
good shielding efficiency for electric fields generally associated with high impedance 
circuits. Magnetic fields, generally associated with low impedance circuits, are more difficult 
to  shield. With decreasing frequency, the losses in reflection and absorption for nonmagnetic 
materials such as aluminum steadily decrease. Thus, it is exceedingly difficult to  shield 
against magnetic fields using non-magnetic materials. At low frequencies (below 150 KHz), 
it is necessary to  use a high-permeability material, such as Mu-metal or Permalloy, to  provide 
satisfactory shielding efficiency to magnetic fields. The attenuation and reflection of a 
shield are the two parameters that determine the shield effectiveness. When a shield is used 
to contain interference, the attenuation (absorption) losses are significant, whereas 
reflection losses become more important when shielding is used to exclude interference at 
susceptible equipment. Reference 14 includes tables giving absorption and reflection losses 
for copper and iron for frequencies ranging from 60 Hz to 10,000 MHz. Investigation of 
sheilding efficiency and theoretical expressions for predicting shielding effectiveness are 
included in references 15, 16, and NASA SP-3067. 
4.4.2 Grounding 
To suppress interference by an effective grounding system, all the spacecraft system’s 
electrical and structural components must be maintained at the same reference potential. 
This is usually accomplished by setting up separate grounding systems for the structural and 
the electrical parts of the system and combining them at one common reference point or 
plane. 
Grounding systems include the static and structural grounds which take in all conductive 
parts of the spacecraft that are not designed to  carry current; ac and dc power grounds; and 
shield grounding. 
In general, for effective grounding, the galvanic action, the electromotive force valence 
potentials, the oxidation rate, and mating materials should be considered as possible sources 
of performance degradation. Any of these may cause additional spurious frequencies to be 
generated so the equipment will in a short time assume a potential other than ground and 
operate as an antenna to receive or transmit energy. This may cause or contribute to  
malfunction of the equipment. Shields should not be used on cables serving as ground 
return paths. 
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4.4.3 Bonding 
Bonding is defined as a fixed union between two metallic conductors that show a uniform 
resistance to a current passing through it.  Bonds must be made so that no additional 
potential gradients will develop which can contribute to interference. Good bonding 
depends on the degree of contact as determined by contact area, pressure, and the condition 
of the surfaces that are joined. If it  is necessary to join metals of different chemical 
composition, care must be taken to  avoid the development of corrosion. The physical size of 
the bond is important because of its effect on the RF impedance. Impedance increases 
linearly with the length of the bonding strap and decreases inversely with the cross-sectional 
area. Also the tendency of current to flow along the outside layers of the bond (the skin 
effect) becomes increasingly important as the frequency under consideration increases. It 
rcsdts in a s  ii;cicasc of the effective resistance as ;; f.--- ulIc.t;vlI ,.c lrc.qucllb> nnll nn r and a sligllt 
increase in the inductance of conductors. To reduce these effects to tolerable levels, bonding 
straps with a length to width ratio of 5 or less are used (ref. 17). 
4.4.4 Filtering 
After interference reduction by gromding and shielding, the residua! conducted 2nd 
radiated interference can be further suppressed by filters. A filter is an electrical circuit or 
network designed to have specific capability for attenuation of various frequencies applied 
to  it. The required attenution is usually a function of the amplitude of the unwanted or 
spurious signals and of either the susceptibility limits of adjacent equipment or the limit 
requirements of the applicable EM1 specifications. It is generally difficult to reduce spurious 
energy at  susceptible equipments since noise potentials can enter by conduction, radiation, 
or a combination of both. Therefore, it  is preferable to use filters at the source of 
electromagnetic interference to  eliminate or minimize extraneous signals or limit the 
bandwidth of required functional signals. 
Filtering of a signal can increase the rise and fall times of digital pulses, thus reducing dv/dt 
noise (ref. 5 ) .  Filtering also helps reduce harmonic frequencies of a pulse train. 
There are several types of filters; the simplest is a shunt capacitor that connects the 
conductor carrying the spurious noise voltages to ground. Ferrite beads are frequently used 
as filters. They are effective in reducing the amplitude of the high frequency components of 
a signal. The apparent effect reduces the rise time of the amplitude and oscillations at the 
leading edge of the waveform. 
4.4.5 Wire Treatment and Routing 
To assess the possibility of adverse interaction between circuits and subsystems, it is 
necessary to analyze intra- and intersystem wiring for its interference and susceptibility 
characteristics and categorize the interconnecting cabling and wiring accordingly. On the 
basis of this analysis, twisting, shielding, bundling, referencing, and grounding can be used to 
eliminate or reduce interaction (ref. 13). 
Circuits normally are classified for treatment on the basis of susceptibility, signal level, and 
frequency. Pyrotechnic circuitry is normally isolated to comply with the applicable test 
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range requirements. Power circuits often are considered separately as cables. (Cable 
segregation and shielding and twisting criteria are prescribed in the EM1 Control Plan.) 
Circuits typically might be classified as follows: 
Power- 
DC primary and secondary power distribution 
AC power distribution 
Quiet circuits- 
Sensitive circuits 
Low level signal circuits 
High impedance circuits 
Noisy circuits- 
Control circuits 
High level signal circuits 
Pyrotechnic firing circuits 
4.5 C O N T R O L  OF E M 1  S O U R C E S  
The techniques for suppressing interference from a functional source are primarily those of 
(1 ) filtering of spurious signals, (2) substituting a more compatible signal-generating method, 
(3) relocating or reorienting signal generators to take advantage of nulls in the emission 
field, (4) increasing the control of frequencies allocated to functional sources, ( 5 )  
controlling the time-sharing of operations to provide electromagnetically quiet intervals for 
the operation of interferencesusceptible equipment, and (6) minimizing the use of 
nonlinear circuits. 
When the source of interference is incidental such as motors or electrical switches, 
suppression can usually be applied at the signal source by several techniques. For example, 
bonding can be used to eliminate arcing which may occur between rotating machinery and 
its enclosure. Grounding and shielding can be effective for reduction of undesired signals. 
For elimination of an undesired signal, a new device sometimes can be substituted for the 
generating equipment that is responsible. 
4.6 P R O T E C T I O N  OF S U S C E P T I B L E  E Q U I P M E N T  
Analysis of the interference at the susceptible equipment usually begins by examining the 
various paths that may be used by the interfering signal. Usually, the more paths, the more 
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vulnerable the system is and the greater the need for interference control techniques. The 
normal input paths of interfering signals are: 
Input power leads 
Interconnecting cables of system 
Case enclosure (penetration) 
Antenna 
Interfering signals may be coupled to an inductor by mutual inductance. If an inductor is 
located near another inductor, a resistor, a conductor, or any circuit element carrying a 
varying current, the resulting magnetic flux will induce a voltage in the inductor. This 
voltage may interfere with the current desired at the inductor. To minimize the effect of 
interference by inductive coupling, the inductor should be shielded or oriented to minimize 
coupling to sources of interference. 
4.6.1 Relays 
The enclosures, cabinets, or consoles used for relay circuitry should be designed and 
constructed .-to provide the maximum practicable isolation. Possible sources of EM1 such as 
power or signal leads must be isolated or shielded to avoid coupling, and filters should be 
used as necessary on leads at their points of entry into the enclosure. 
Relays used in areas where interference is likely should have their own metal enclosure 
without mechanical discontinuities. Solid state relays, as well as other EM1 sensitive 
electronic components, should be protected by means of a signal ground. This ground is a 
low-impedance circuit used to minimize introduction of spurious voltages into the signal 
circuitry. Single-point grounding is used for low-frequency currents and multiple grounding 
for high frequencies. In the former, twisted circuit leads will help eliminate low frequency 
magnetic field interference. In multiple grounding, currents flow in the ground reference 
and cause magnetic fields. A combination of single and multiple grounding is possible. 
4.6.2 Conductors 
An electromagnetic force is produced in any single conductor when it is exposed to either 
an electric or non-parallel, varying magnetic field. If a conductor, however, were positioned 
in a varying magnetic field so that the field lines of flux did not link the conductor, no emf 
would be generated. Therefore, particularly in chassis wiring, an attempt should be made to  
lay out conductors which are potentially susceptible to this type of interference at right 
angles to each other. At the least, parallel conductors should be kept to a minimum. 
The susceptibility of conductors to induced signals can be reduced by shielding in 
conjunction with appropriate techniques for grounding the shield and, in the case of 
conductive pairs, by twisting. Bundling of compatible conductors is recommended to  
minimize shielding requirements. 
25 
4.6.3 Tubes 
Electron tubes such as photomultipliers and vidicon tubes, especially those with high gain, 
are susceptible to interference. If an undesired signal appears on the grid of a tube, it is 
amplified along with the desired signal and thereby causes interference in the output. This is 
further complicated by the nonlinear characteristics of the tube, Le., if two signals appear 
on the grid of the tube, the waveform of the alternating anode current contains the applied 
frequencies and their harmonics plus frequencies equal to the sum and differences of the 
applied frequencies and their harmonics. The use of shielded wires in the grid circuit is 
recommended for this problem. 
Electron tubes can pick up interfering signals through their envelope, especially when 
operating near an RF field, but the use of tube shields solves this problem. Mechanical 
vibrations affect electron tubes by causing the generation of microphonics; therefore, 
ruggedized tubes should be used whenever possible to minimize this effect. Also, electron 
tubes are affected by nuclear radiation, which causes a change in tube characteristics, but 
the use of ceramic tubes reduces this problem. 
4.6.4 Connectors 
Connectors can provide easy entrance to interfere ce from RF transmission unless properly 
protected by appropriate means of shielding. Many shielding techniques are employed to 
suppress EMI. All connectors used as a conducting path for functional transmissions should 
be physically bonded (welded, bolted, or clamped) across an interface to the static ground. 
The maximum bonding resistance should not exceed about 10 milliohm. 
Crosstalk effects in connectors can be minimized by proper connector-pin assignments. 
Reference 18 defines a set of criteria that can be used for making pin assignments and 
develops a valuable technique for making initial critical signal-pin assignments. 
4.6.5 Semi-Conductor and Integrated Circuit Devices 
Semi-conductor and integrated circuit devices are sensitive to momentary overload which can 
cause burnout of the semi-conductor material or the fine wires. Small amounts of RF energy 
can change the bias and operation of integrated circuits by rectification of the RF at the 
junctions which act like diodes. 
To prevent susceptibility of semi-conductors and integrated circuits to EMI, leads should be 
filtered as necessary and the modules or enclosures appropriately shielded. When impulse 
type of interference on power leads is difficult to filter, voltage regulators can often be used 
for protection. 
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4.7 TESTING 
The control plan should outline and describe tests which have a direct bearing on design 
measures for solving electromagnetic interference problems. Typical tests, some of which are 
listed in section 3.4, should be modified on the basis of the specific requirements of the 
spacecraft and the parameters under test. 
The test sites should provide a low-noise, adequately protected environment such as a screen 
room or shielded enclosure which attenuates to a high degree all outside signals and serves to 
contain to the same degree all inside signals. However? as spacecraft systems become larger 
and testing includes associated ground equipment, the controlled environment approach 
may become impractical. In this event the ambient interference level of the particular test 
environment should be determined and tests modified accordingly. T i e  ambient 
environment may be evaluated directly, by tests, or analytically by examining the sources 
in the area. 
27 
3 
I 
REFERENCES 
1 . Anon.: Description of Electromagnetic Environment for High Altitude Satellite Tests. 
Report by Jansky & Bailey Division, prepared under NASA Contract NAS 5-3 157 with 
Atlantic Res. Corp., Alexandria, Va. June 1963. 
2. Am::. : Electromagnetk Compatibility Piiiiciples aiid Practices XASA Handbook NHB 
5320.3, Oct. 1965. 
3. Smith, E.J.: Noisy Spacecraft ‘‘I Have Known”. NASA Tech Memo 33 402 
(Proceedings of the Spacecraft Electromagnetic Interference Workshop at JPL, Feb 6-8 
1968) Dec. 1968, pp. 101-109. 
4. Case, R.K.; and Kee!er, L.H.: Electromagnetic kterference Aspects of Integrating a 
UHF/VHF Receiver Onboard Manner V. Jet Propulsion Laboratory Technical Report 
32-1315, NOV. 1, 1968. 
5. Whittlesey, A.C.: An Introduction to Electromagnetic Interference, its Causes and 
Prevention. Jet Propulsion Laboratory Report 900-328 (Rev. A), Nov. 1969. 
6. Anon. : “Electromagnetic Compatibility”, AFSC Design Handbook DHI4, Series 1-0. 
General, 1st ed. Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson AF Base, Ohio, Jan. 10, 
1969. 
7. Burdick, E.E. and Frankos, D.T.: Manner Mars ’69 EMC Problem Failure Report Study 
for Updating Mariner ’7 1 Design Constraints. Jet Propulsion Laboratory Final Report, 
February 6,1970. 
8 .  Anon. : Quarterly Progress Report (ART/SRT) Research & Advanced Technological 
Development Activities, Systems Reliability Directorate, NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, Sept. 1967. 
9. Anon. : Electromagnetic Compatibility (MSFC-SPEC-279). NASA Marshall Space Flight 
Center, June 1,1964. 
10. Anon. : MIL-STD-826 and 826 A, Electromagnetic Interference Test Requirements and 
Test Methods. U.S. Air Force, Jan. 1964 and June 1966. 
11. Paul, C.R.; and Edwards, J.H.: Computer Aided Compatibility Prediction. IEEE 
International Electromagnetic Compatibility Symposium Record, Philadelphia Pa. July 
13-15, 1971, pp. 210-214. 
12. Biber, K.W.; and Thomas, A.K.: Computer Assisted EMC Program on Pioneer F and G .  
IEEE International Electromagnetic Compatibility Symposium Record, Philadelphia, 
Pa. July 13-15, 1971, pp. 294-298. 
29 , 
13. Pearlston, C.B., Jr. : Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements for Space Systems. 
Report TOR-1001 (2307)4, Reissue A, Contract AF 04(695)-1001 , Engr. Sci. 
Operations, Aerospace Corp. (El Segundo, Calif.), July 1969. 
14. Pearlston, C.B., Jr.: Case and Cable Shielding, Bonding and Grounding Considerations 
in Electromagnetic Interference. IRE Transactions on Radio Frequency Interference, 
vol. RFI4 ,  no. 3, pp. 1-1 6, October 1962. 
15. Anon.: Investigation of Shielding Efficiency. Report 9,  Final Development Report, 
Contract NObsr49161 , Breeze Corp., Newark, N.J., Nov. 1952. (Available from Federal 
Clearinghouse, AD 66241 6). 
16. Banister, P.R. : New Theoretical Expressions for Predicting Shielding Effectiveness for 
the Plane Shield Case. Report USL 851, US.  Navy Underwater Sound Lab., (New 
London, Conn.), Nov. 1967 (Available from Federal Clearinghouse, AD 663-104). 
17. Anon.:  MIL-STD 461 and 462, Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, 
Requirements for Dept. of Defense, Aug. 1968 and July 1967. 
18. Craig, R.D. : Optimization of Connector-Pin Assignments in Electrical/Electronic Wiring 
Systems. Proceedings of Eighth Reliability and Maintainability Conference, Denver, 
Colorado, July 1969, pp. 334-340. 
30 
NASA SPACE VEHICLE DESIGN CRITERIA 
MONOGRAPHS 
ENVIRONMENT 
SP-8005 
I SP-80 10 
SP-8011 
SP-80 13 
SP-80 17 
SP-8020 
SP-802 1 
SP-8023 
SP-8037 
SP-803 8 
SP-8049 
SP-8067 
SP-8069 
SP-8084 
SP-80 8 5 
STRUCTURES 
SP-800 1 
Solar Electromagnetic Radiation, revised May 197 1 
Models of Mars Atmosphere (1967), Kay i968 
Models of Venus Atmosphere (1 968), December 1968 
Meteoroid Environment Model-1 969 (Near Earth to 
Lunar Surface), March 1969 
Magnetic Fieids-Earth and Bxtraterrcstria!, March 1969 
Mars Surface Models (1968), May 1969 
Models of Earth’s Atmosphere (120 to 1000 km), May 
1969 
Lunar Surface Models, May 1969 
Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Magnetic Fields, 
September 1970 
Meteoroid Environment Model- 1970 (Interplanetary and 
Planetary), October 1970 
The Earth’s Ionosphere, March 1971 
Earth Albedo and Emitted Radiation, July 197 I 
The Planet Jupiter (1 970), December 197 1 
Surface Atmospheric Extremes (Launch and Transportation 
Areas), May 1972 
The Planet Mercury (1 97 1 ), March 1972 
Buffeting During Atmospheric Ascent, revised November 
1970 
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SP-8002 
SP-8003 
SP-8004 
SP-8006 
SP-8007 
SP-8008 
SP-8009 
SP-80 12 
SP-80 14 
SP-80 19 
SP-8 02 2 
SP-8 0 2 9 
SP-803 1 
SP-8032 
SP-8035 
SP-8040 
SP-8042 
SP-8043 
SP-8044 
SP-8045 
SP-8046 
Flight-Loads Measurements During Launch and Exit, 
December 1964 
Flutter, Buzz, and Divergence, July 1964 
Panel Flutter, July 1964 
Local Steady Aerodynamic Loads During Launch and 
Exit, May 1965 
Buckling of Thin-Walled Circular Cylinders, revised August 
1968 
Prelaunch Ground Wind Loads, November 1965 
Propellant Slosh Loads, August 1968 
Natural Vibration Modal Analysis, September 1968 
Entry Thermal Protection, August 1968 
Buckling of Thin-Walled Truncated Cones. September 
1968 
Staging Loads, February 1969 
Aeordynamic and Rocket-Exhaust Heating During Launch 
and Ascent, May 1969 
Slosh Suppression, May 1969 
Buckling of Thin-Walled Doubly Curved Shells, August 
1969 
Wind Loads During Ascent. June 1970 
Fracture Control of Metallic Pressure Vessels, May 1970 
Meteoroid Damage Assessment, May 1970 
Design-Development testing, May 1970 
Qualification testing, May 1970 
Acceptance testing, April 1970 
Landing Impact Attenuation For Non-Surface-Planing 
Landers, April 1970 
SP-8 0 5 0 Structural Vibration Prediction, June 1970 
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SP-80 5 3 
SP-8054 
SP-805 5 
SP-8056 
SP-8057 
SP-8060 
SP-806 1 
SP-8062 
SP-8063 
SP-8066 
SP-8068 
SP-80 7 2 
SP-8 077 
SP-8079 
SP-8082 
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL 
SP-80 15 
SP-80 16 
SP-80 18 
SP-8024 
Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects on Materials, June 
1970 
Space Radiation Protection. June 1970 
Prevention of Coupled Structure-Propulsion Instability 
(Pogo), October 1970 
Flight Separation Mechanisms, October 1970 
Structural Design Criteria Applicable to a Sphce Shuttle, 
January 1971 
Compartment Venting, November 1970 
Interaction with Umbilicals. and Launch Stand, August 
1970 
Entry Gasdynamic Heating, January 197 1 
Lubrication, Friction, and Wear, June 197 1 
De ploy able Aerodynamic Deceleration Systems, June 
1971 
Buckling Strength of Structural Plates. June 197 1 
Acoustic Loads Generated by the Propulsion System, June 
1971 
Transportation and Handling Loads, September 197 I 
Structural Interaction with Control Systems, November 197 I 
Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Metals, August 197 1 
Guidance and Navigation for Entry Vehicles, November 
1968 
Effects of Structural Flexibility on Spacecraft Control 
Systems, April 1 969 
Spacecraft Magnetic Torques, March 1969 
Spacecraft Gravitational Torques, May 1969 
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SP-80 2 6 
SP-8 0 2 7 
SP-8 0 2 8 
SP-8033 
SP-8034 
SP-8036 
SP-8047 
SP-8058 
SP-8059 
SP-8065 
SP-8 0 70 
SP-807 1 
SP-8074 
SP-80 7 8 
CHEMICAL PROPULSION 
SP-8025 
SP-804 1 
SP-8048 
SP-805 1 
SP-8052 
Spacecraft Star Trackers, July 1970 
Spacecraft Radiation Torques. October 1969 
Entry Vehicle Control, November 1969 
Spacecraft Earth Horizon Sensors. December 1969 
Spacecraft Mass Expulsion Torques, December 1969 
Effects of Structural Flexibility on Launch Vehicle 
Control Systems, February 1970 
Spacecraft Sun Sensors, June 1970 
Spacecraft Aerodynamic Torques, January 197 1 
Spacecraft Attitude Control During Thrusting Maneuvers, 
February 1971 
Tubular Spacecraft Booms (Extendible. Reel Stored), 
February 1971 
Spaceborne Digital Computer Systems, March 197 1 
Passive Gravity Gradient Libration Dampers, February 
1971 
Spacecraft Solar Cell Arrays, May 1971 
Spaceborne Electronic Imaging Systems, June 197 1 
Solid Rocket Motor Metal Cases, April 1970 
Captive-Fired Testing of Solid Rocket Motors, March 197 1 
Liquid Rocket Engine Turbopump Bearings, March 197 1 
Solid Rocket Motor Igniters, March 1971 
Liquid Rocket Engine Turbopump Inducers, May 197 1 
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